8 FSM Intrm. 394-396

A commitment in a personnel action form for permanent employment without the existence of an appropriation to fund such a position violates the Truk Financial Management Act. Hauk v. Terravecchia, 8 FSM Intrm. 394, 396 (Chk. 1998).

preparation of a eligible list by the Personnel Officer violates the Truk State Public Service System Act. Hauk v. Terravecchia, 8 FSM Intrm. 394, 396 (Chk. 1998).

Even though there is offer and acceptance and consideration exists, there is no contract when the agent signing the proposal was without authority to bind the principal, and the signing violated statutes, which rendered it illegal. Hauk v. Terravecchia, 8 FSM Intrm. 394, 396 (Chk. 1998).

Principles of contract are inapplicable to employment cases when the proper issue is whether plaintiff his shown a legal entitlement to permanent employment under the Truk State Public Service System Act. Hauk v. Terravecchia, 8 FSM Intrm. 394, 396 (Chk. 1998).

This case was tried on June 30 and July 1. Oral arguments were made on July 3, 1998. At the close of the plaintiff's case in chief, upon motion by the defendants pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the FSM Rules of Civil Procedure, the action was dismissed as to Detor Santos in his individual and official capacities and as to Masachiro Christlib and Roger Mori in their individual capacities.

The plaintiff alleges that he is entitled to permanent employment in the Public Service with the Chuuk State Legislature because he successfully completed a one year training period with the Legislature under the auspices of the Joint Training Partnership Act (JTPA) which was the condition to such employment. He states that the Personnel Action Form was a contract and that he was the intended third party beneficiary.

Plaintiff was selected to be a trainee legal aide with the Legislature for one year. His Personnel Action Form, effective June 26, 1995, stated,

Participant will be trained under JTPA Program for a period of 52 weeks. Training cost will not exceed $8,450.00. Participant will become a permanent Legal Aid at the Office of the Legislative Counsel, Chuuk State Legislature upon successful completion of his training period. Training will not exceed June 26, 1996. Re: Proposal by Legislature dtd. 06/12/95.

The Proposal dated June 12, 1995 referred to in the Form is signed by the Assistant Legislative Counsel for the Legislative Counsel and states in part, "The legislative Presiding Officers authorize me to inform you that the legislature can ensure continued employment to the trainee after the termination of the agreement only upon a satisfactory review of the participant's performance by the office of the Legislative Counsel.'"

The plaintiff did satisfactorily complete the one year training, earning high praise by his supervisors in the Office of the Legislative Counsel.

Legal Aides are hired and removed by the Legislative Counsel with the concurrence of the President and the Speaker.

The following fact is in dispute: Whether the presiding officers committed the Legislature to the obligation for continued employment. I find that the plaintiff has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that they did.

I summarize some of my reasons for this finding. The Speaker denied any knowledge of the condition in the Personnel Action Form until long after this action was commenced. His opinion was that such a commitment would be unlawful. The plaintiff testified that the "Presiding Officers" referred to in the Proposal were the Vice President and the Vice Speaker who were acting when the President and Speaker were off-island. Those who were Vice President and Vice Speaker in 1995 are now employed on Weno, are subject to subpoena, but neither were called.

There is no testimony that at any time during the one year training period the condition in the Personnel Action Form was communicated to the Speaker or the President, not even by the plaintiff who requested permanent employment from the Speaker more than once during the year.

1. No commitment binding the President, the Speaker or Legislature exists which would require granting the plaintiff permanent employment after the one year training period was completed successfully.

2. In any event, the commitment in the Personnel Action Form violates the Truk Financial Management Act, Truk S.L. No. 5-44, in that it creates an obligation without the existence of an appropriation to fund such position, and the position of Legal Aide did not exist at the time.

3. Additionally, the granting of permanent employment according to the Personnel Action Form violates the Truk State Public Service System Act, Truk S.L. No. 3-43, in that the hiring would be without advertisement, examination (if required) and the preparation of a eligible list by the Personnel Officer as required by the Act.

4. In contract terms, which the plaintiff used throughout the case, the Proposal of June 12, 1995 would be the offer and the Personnel Action Form the acceptance. Consideration exists in that JTPA pays the plaintiff's salary for the year and the Legislature trains the plaintiff and gives him permanent employment.

There is no contract, however, since the agent signing the Proposal was without authority to bind the Legislature, and the violations of statutes, as described above, render it illegal.

In any event, principles of contract are inapplicable to this employment case. Cf. Sohl v. FSM, 4 FSM Intrm. 186 (Pon. 1990). The proper issue is whether plaintiff his shown a legal entitlement to permanent employment under the Truk State Public Service System Act. These conclusions show that he has not.


	THE SUPREME COURT OF THE FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA Cite as Hauk v. Taerravecchia , 8 FSM Intrm. 394 (Chk. 1999) [8 FSM Intrm. 394] G.T.E. HAUK, Plaintiff, vs. STEPHEN TERRAVECCHIA, MASACHIRO CHRISTLIB, DETOR SANTOS, ROGER MORI (in their individual or official capacities as legislative counsel, Speaker, President, Former President, respectively) and CHUUK LEGISLATURE, Defendants. CIVIL ACTION NO. 1997-1046 FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Richard H. Benson Associate Justice Trial: June 30, July 1, 3, 1998 Decided: July 31, 1998 APPEARANCES: For the Plaintiff: G.T.E. Hauk (pro se) P.O. Box 385 Weno, Chuuk FM 96942 For the Defendants: Johnny Meippen, Esq. P.O. Box 705 Weno, Chuuk FM 96942 For the Defendant: Wesley Simina, Esq. (Christlib) P.O. Box 94 Weno, Chuuk FM 96942 * * * * HEADNOTES Public Officers and Employees ) Chuuk A commitment in a personnel action form for permanent employment without the existence of an appropriation to fund such a position violates the Truk Financial Management Act. Hauk v. Terravecchia, 8 FSM Intrm. 394, 396 (Chk. 1998). Public Officers and Employees ) Chuuk Granting of permanent employment without advertisement, examination (if required) and the [8 FSM Intrm. 395] preparation of a eligible list by the Personnel Officer violates the Truk State Public Service System Act. Hauk v. Terravecchia, 8 FSM Intrm. 394, 396 (Chk. 1998). Contracts ) Illegality Even though there is offer and acceptance and consideration exists, there is no contract when the agent signing the proposal was without authority to bind the principal, and the signing violated statutes, which rendered it illegal. Hauk v. Terravecchia, 8 FSM Intrm. 394, 396 (Chk. 1998). Contracts; Public Officers and Employees ) Chuuk Principles of contract are inapplicable to employment cases when the proper issue is whether plaintiff his shown a legal entitlement to permanent employment under the Truk State Public Service System Act. Hauk v. Terravecchia, 8 FSM Intrm. 394, 396 (Chk. 1998). * * * * COURT'S OPINION RICHARD H. BENSON, Associate Justice: This case was tried on June 30 and July 1. Oral arguments were made on July 3, 1998. At the close of the plaintiff's case in chief, upon motion by the defendants pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the FSM Rules of Civil Procedure, the action was dismissed as to Detor Santos in his individual and official capacities and as to Masachiro Christlib and Roger Mori in their individual capacities. The plaintiff alleges that he is entitled to permanent employment in the Public Service with the Chuuk State Legislature because he successfully completed a one year training period with the Legislature under the auspices of the Joint Training Partnership Act (JTPA) which was the condition to such employment. He states that the Personnel Action Form was a contract and that he was the intended third party beneficiary. Findings of Fact The following facts are undisputed: Plaintiff was selected to be a trainee legal aide with the Legislature for one year. His Personnel Action Form, effective June 26, 1995, stated, Participant will be trained under JTPA Program for a period of 52 weeks. Training cost will not exceed $8,450.00. Participant will become a permanent Legal Aid at the Office of the Legislative Counsel, Chuuk State Legislature upon successful completion of his training period. Training will not exceed June 26, 1996. Re: Proposal by Legislature dtd. 06/12/95. This Personnel Action Form is not signed by any representative of the Legislature. The Proposal dated June 12, 1995 referred to in the Form is signed by the Assistant Legislative Counsel for the Legislative Counsel and states in part, "The legislative Presiding Officers authorize me to inform you that the legislature can ensure continued employment to the trainee after the termination of the agreement only upon a satisfactory review of the participant's performance by the office of the Legislative Counsel.'" [8 FSM Intrm. 396] The plaintiff did satisfactorily complete the one year training, earning high praise by his supervisors in the Office of the Legislative Counsel. For fiscal year 1996, no Legal Aide position was funded. There was such a position funded the following year. Legal Aides are hired and removed by the Legislative Counsel with the concurrence of the President and the Speaker. The following fact is in dispute: Whether the presiding officers committed the Legislature to the obligation for continued employment. I find that the plaintiff has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that they did. I summarize some of my reasons for this finding. The Speaker denied any knowledge of the condition in the Personnel Action Form until long after this action was commenced. His opinion was that such a commitment would be unlawful. The plaintiff testified that the "Presiding Officers" referred to in the Proposal were the Vice President and the Vice Speaker who were acting when the President and Speaker were off-island. Those who were Vice President and Vice Speaker in 1995 are now employed on Weno, are subject to subpoena, but neither were called. There is no testimony that at any time during the one year training period the condition in the Personnel Action Form was communicated to the Speaker or the President, not even by the plaintiff who requested permanent employment from the Speaker more than once during the year. Conclusions of Law 1. No commitment binding the President, the Speaker or Legislature exists which would require granting the plaintiff permanent employment after the one year training period was completed successfully. 2. In any event, the commitment in the Personnel Action Form violates the Truk Financial Management Act, Truk S.L. No. 5-44, in that it creates an obligation without the existence of an appropriation to fund such position, and the position of Legal Aide did not exist at the time. 3. Additionally, the granting of permanent employment according to the Personnel Action Form violates the Truk State Public Service System Act, Truk S.L. No. 3-43, in that the hiring would be without advertisement, examination (if required) and the preparation of a eligible list by the Personnel Officer as required by the Act. 4. In contract terms, which the plaintiff used throughout the case, the Proposal of June 12, 1995 would be the offer and the Personnel Action Form the acceptance. Consideration exists in that JTPA pays the plaintiff's salary for the year and the Legislature trains the plaintiff and gives him permanent employment. There is no contract, however, since the agent signing the Proposal was without authority to bind the Legislature, and the violations of statutes, as described above, render it illegal. In any event, principles of contract are inapplicable to this employment case. Cf. Sohl v. FSM, 4 FSM Intrm. 186 (Pon. 1990). The proper issue is whether plaintiff his shown a legal entitlement to permanent employment under the Truk State Public Service System Act. These conclusions show that he has not. [8 FSM Intrm. 397] Let judgment be entered accordingly. * * * *